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PRIGOZHIN’S CHILDREN: THE NEW WAVE OF RUSSIAN PMCS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITY OF COMMAND

For a system seemingly so committed to the ‘Power Vertical’ and Vladimir Putin’s personal and
unlimited authority, modern Russia is also strikingly prone to outsourcing key state
functions, from diplomacy to warfighting. Wagner was neither the first Russian Private
Military Company (PMC), nor has it proven the last. This report by Mark Galeotti and Anna Arutunyan, written for the US EUCOM’s Russian Strategic Initiative in 2024, looks at all the so-called ‘volunteer’ forces Moscow now deploys, from PMCs to the BARS reserve units, the units bankrolled by corporations and regional governments, to the Chechen Akhmat Battalions, as well as the new Africa Corps, to explore the shape of these forces after the Wagner mutiny.

Photo © Mark Galeotti

PUTIN’S PRAETORIANS: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THEIR CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE STREETS

A report produced in 2024 for the US EUCOM’s Russian Strategic Initiative on the resources and capacity of the Rosgvardiya to continue to maintain public order on Russia’s streets, especially considering its growing wartime role of rear-area security in occupied territories, in the context of the so-called ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine, we well as the questions about its commander, Gen. Viktor Zolotov. (© Mayak Intelligence, and released with the kind permission of the RSI)

SPETSNAZ: THE MEN BEHIND THE MISSION

From early 2022, and thus based on research largely predating the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a report for the US EUCOM’s Russian Strategic Initiative on the attitudes of current and former Spetsnaz special forces towards their role, organizational culture, and involvement in politics. It was based on interviews as well as analysis of social media and similar arm’s length sources (© Mayak Intelligence, and released with the kind permission of the RSI)

THE SECRETARIAT: THE SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF AND RUSSIAN POLICYMAKING

Security Council Meeting, 21 February 2022 (RF Presidential Administration, CC 4.0)

Another RSI report from 2022, by Mark Galeotti and Anna Arutunyan, that explores the role of the Secretariat of the Russian Security Council (SovBez), the key civilian agency shaping security policy, in some ways analogous to the US National Security Council Staff. Until May 2024, it was headed by the hawk’s hawk, Nikolai Patrushev, who had in effect acquired for himself a role equivalent to National Security Adviser and Director of National Intelligence — two roles otherwise absent in the Russian political system — in one. We await to see what difference his replacement with Sergei Shoigu will make.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT LEADERSHIP & ORGANISATION

A supplement to the report above, also from 2022, providing more details on the senior staff of the Russian Security Council Secretariat and its various bodies.

THE DECORATIVE HAWK: DMITRY MEDVEDEV AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Another supplement to the original report, by Mark Galeotti and Anna Arutunyan, looking in more detail at Dmitry Medvedev’s position within the Security Council Secretariat, as of early 2022.

THE MAIN OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE: THE HEAD AND HEART OF THE RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF

Another EUCOM RSI report, this time from 2021, on the Main Operations Directorate (GOU) of the General Staff, which is the keystone of the entire Russian military command structure, providing context for political decisions, expertise to policy drafting and guidance to operational commands. It plays a crucial role not simply in monitoring and analysing the contemporary military-political scene but also in shaping Russia’s foundational policy documents – and then operationalising them in terms of what they demand in terms of deployments, equipment and training needs, and future force development. At least that’s the idea: the war in Ukraine, and especially the ill-fated February 2022 invasion, demonstrate that it is not always quite so straightforward.

THE MAIN OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE AND COMMAND & CONTROL OF THE SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT

An adjunct to the main report on the Main Operations Directorate (GOU) of the General Staff produced for EUCOM RSI in 2021, looking specifically at command and control in the Syrian theatre. This flowed from a Combat Management Group (GBU: Gruppa Boevogo Upravlenii) within the National Defence Management Centre (NTsUO: Natsional’nyi Tsentr Upravleniya Oboronoi) in Moscow, to the Command Post of the Group of Forces in Syria (KPGV: Komandnyi Punkt Gruppirovki Voisk) at Hmeimim Air Base, to the specific Russian units in theatre, and proved surprisingly effective.